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REMARKS:
JOSEPH CROWLEY*
In the late summer of 1970 the law faculty of Fordham became aware
that the AAUP was attempting to organize the faculty of Fordham on a
university-wide basis. Thus, the question posed to the law faculty was:
"What should be the position of a law faculty when confronted with or-
ganizational activity seeking a university-wide unit ?"
The law faculty concluded that it did not desire the establishment of a
traditional collective bargaining relationship. Rather the law faculty felt
that it wished to continue a somewhat informal relationship with univer-
sity administrators wherein periodic discussions were held to discuss the
needs of the law school including recruitment and compensation. The fac-
ulty also concluded that the inclusion of the law faculty in an overall uni-
versity unit would not be in the best interest of the law school and that it
would tend to erode the degree of autonomy possessed by the law school.
Underlying these conclusions were the considerations set forth in the report
for the AALS prepared by Professors Gorman and Oberer and Dean So.
vern.
Representatives of the law faculty then met with the AAUP. As a re,
sult of this meeting the AAUP agreed to exclude the law faculty from the
petition it was about to file. The university administrators were asked by
the law faculty if they too would agree to the exclusion of the law faculty
from the proposed unit. The university would not agree. Thus as the
Fordham University case came before the NLRB the petitioner, AAUP, had
agreed to seek exclusion of the law faculty from the proposed unit while
the employer had determined to insist upon the inclusion of the law faculty.
It seemed imperative that the law faculty should ,seek a way to partici-
pate in the NLRB proceedings so that it would have an opportunity to pre-
sent its views.
Therefore, the law faculty organized the Law School Bargaining Com-
mittee so as to satisfy the definition of a labor organization within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.1 After the AAUP filed its
petition with the NLRB, the Law School Bargaining Committee filed a peti-
tion seeking a separate unit for the law faculty. Filing of this latter peti-
tion was essentially a defensive action designed to provide a forum to con-
tend against the inclusion of the law faculty in an overall faculty unit and
to argue the merits of a separate unit for a law faculty. In filing the peti-
tion, the law faculty was not too optimistic because it thought that the
NLRB would seek to avoid fragmentation in the initial stages of collective
bargaining between universities and their professional staff. However,
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the result as you know did not justify our lack of optimism. In fact a
footnote in the Fordham decision indicated that the NLRB would not be
adverse to further fragmentation of a university faculty. -
In the election which ensued, the law faculty voted in favor of the Law
School Bargaining Committee while the rest of the faculty voted down the
AAUP by a narrow margin. The decision of the law faculty to vote for
the Law School Bargaining Committee was again in the main to preserve
the separateness granted by the Board and to avoid relitigation of the same
issue in the future. I take this opportunity to thank the AALS and par-
ticularly Alvin Goldman for the excellent amicus brief filed with the
NLRB.
It was mentioned by Professor Gorman that in the unit established for
the law school, regular part time faculty members were included 3 Now
quite obviously, part time men would not have the interest in or even par-
ticipate in the usual fringe benefits. Generally their sole concern would
be the remuneration per course taught, but, even on that basis, the part
time faculty member's interest in conditions of employment has not ap-
peared to be very significant. At the same time the law librarian at Ford-
ham, who is a member of the faculty, was excluded from the unit as a
supervisor because of his responsibilities as law librarian.
What is the role of the Law School Bargaining Committee at this
point? I have mentioned several times that the law faculty does not de-
sire the establishment of a traditional collective bargaining relationship. I
think we have to evolve something new-a relationship befitting a profes-
sional faculty. We've had one negotiation session with the administra-
tors of the university, and I would report that the discussions to date are
quite similar to those we've had in the past, prior to the Board pro:eeding.
The primary gain derived from the NLRB proceeding is that the univer-
sity realizes that it must meet with the law faculty, discuss problems of
mutual concern, reach an agreement on the resolution of such problems
and set forth in writing the agreement reached.
2 193 N.L.R.B. No. 23. In contrast, see Wayne State University, 3 CCH LAB. L REP.
[State Laws) 5 49,998.93 in which the Michigan Employment Relations Commission refused to
separate the medical faculty from a university-wide faculty unit.
3 The New York Public Employment Relations Board set up a separate unit of part.time
faculty in N.Y. P.E.R.B. 2-3000, 2-3026, 2-3056 (1970).
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ALVIN GOLDMAN
Assuming that we are given our choice as to whether we as members of
the law faculty should engage in collective bargaining, should our choice be
in favor of that means for settling the terms and conditions of our employ.
ment? This question can only be answered in light of the alternatives.
One alternative to collective representation is maintenance of the status
quo. It is hard to determine just what is that status quo. A few studies,
mostly AALS sponsored, and generally rather dated, have attempted to
survey the prevailing modes for resolving critical issues respecting the terms
of law faculty employment. These studies reveal that in the setting of sal-
aries usually the dean has a fair amount of discretion subject to varying de-
grees of review by university officials.' Whether such salary decisions are
made largely on a laissez-faire type, individual bargaining basis, or are
confined by a concept of overall group pattern, will depend, among other
things, upon the personality of the dean, the tone and texture of the law
faculty, past practices and university policies. Other terms of employment
such as promotions, tenure, course assignments, decanal selection and
course loads are generally determined with a considerable amount of law
faculty participation. 2 At some institutions these questions are wholly re-
solved by all or part of the law faculty. At other schools the faculty's role
in such matters is more limited. Whatever the format at a given institution
however, it is probably safe to say that rarely are these noncompensatory
dimensions of the law teachers' terms and conditions of employment de-
termined according to a strictly individualistic bargaining model.
It is obvious, therefore, that in setting the terms and conditions of law
faculty employment a collective element is already present, though perhaps
that collective element tends more to corporate or partnership decision-
making than to collective bargaining. Moreover, in at least some law
schools, perhaps many, the dean acts as the collective's representative in
efforts to secure improvement in terms and conditions of employment. And
here I'll depart from the descriptive and assert that no person should serve
as a dean unless he or she is prepared to be such a corporate or collective
representative of the law faculty vis-a-vis the university administration.
Aside from the collective bargaining approach, the individual bargain-
ing approach-if such exists at any law faculty-and the mixed systems
which generally characterize the status quo, there is at least one other op-
tion which could be developed for setting the terms of law faculty employ-
ment. That option is militant utilization of the qualifying standards ad-
ministered by our accreditation agency, the Association of American Law
I See, e.g., ASS'N OF AMER. LAW SCHOOLs, ANATOMY OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION
195-202 (1961).
2 Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK at 49 (1967).
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Schools. A prerequisite for such a model would be for the AALS to de-
velop a far more detailed schedule of accreditation standards than is pres-
ently utilized. Such standards would include specific procedural and sub-
stantive provisions as contrasted with the more general statements of policy
characterizing our present approach. These provisions would contain such
details as a minimum compensation schedule or salary benchmarks based,
perhaps, on rank and longevity. This approach could go further and en-
compass minimum schedules plus rated pay schedules for above-minimum
salaries in a manner similar to the rating system used by the AAUP. The
AALS standards would also have to spell out maximum course loads, a
code of conduct, required substantive and procedural safeguards of student
and faculty liberty, promotion and tenure standards and review procedures,
specifications of minimal library facilities and maintenance standards
(again with the possibility of using a rating system in addition to min-
mum standards), minimum office space criteria, perhaps a minimum stu-
dent to faculty ratio and the like.
Those of you who have examined the present AALS regulations know
that a few of the above suggested areas for specifications are already in the
regulations-though almost always in hortatory terms. And such detailed
standards are found only in the minority of our accreditation regulations.
Upon establishing specific, concrete accreditation standards, the AALS
would have to rigorously enforce them, suspending and expelling non-
complying institutions-a practice which our organization's past gentility
seems to have precluded. Beyond that, it would be advisable for the AALS
to lobby for its accreditation becoming the standard for diploma recogni-
tion by the licensing authorities. It would also be wise under such a system
for the AALS to engage in public relations activities designed to dissuade
teachers from working at, students from attending, and employers from
hiring at those law schools which do not carry the AALS stamp of approval.
In this process we would be well advised to play upon the status drive of
university administrators. Bombard them with well executed photos re-
vealing that the curvy coeds, broad-shouldered jocks, and the moneyed
alumni all admire the leader who has an AALS accredited law school with
A+ compensation standards, fringe benefits and plenty of equipment. To
make all this more palatable to outsiders, it would be wise to have minor-
ity participation on the accreditation council by practitioners, students, and
university administrators (preferably those administrators who are former
law teachers), or possibly an advisory council composed of such persons.
All this would of course require a larger national office and a fatter
budget for the AALS. Two thousand law teachers at $50.00 a head could,
for example, generate an additional $100,000.00 income for the Association.
I cannot say with confidence whether that increment would be enough to
do the job, but for $50.00 to $100.00 in personal dues, tax deductible no
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doubt, we should have a fighting chance and the prospective benefits should
be well worth the financial risk.
Now, how does this last alternative, let us for convenience call it the
Militant Accreditation Model, stack up against collective bargainin ? For
one thing, the Militant Accreditation Model eliminates having to rely up-
on work stoppages. This is very important for those of us who work in
public institutions inasmuch as we can expect work stoppages to be out-
lawed.3 Although collective negotiation is possible even without the abil-
ity to resort to work stoppages, substitute forms of bargaining leverage are
necessary if the work stoppage is unavailable. The Militant Accreditation
Model is structured around such substitutes-i.e., various forms of boycotts
in hiring, replacement and product merchandising and manipulation of the
adversary's status drive.
Avoiding reliance upon work stoppages for achieving group goals re-
garding law teacher employment should be attractive to those law teachers
who have ethical misgivings concerning use of the strike weapon by law
faculties. It should also appeal to those with misgivings about law teacher
strikes based on an expectation that strike breakers-able, licensed ones at
that-would be readily available in the event of a law faculty work stop-
page.
The Militant Accreditation Model also avoids some of the local quasi-
political problems resulting from bargaining unit structure: problems such
as setting part time teacher prerogatives, deciding whether to give faculty
status to librarians and clinicians, determining how to slice the faculty
salary pie, whether to seek new positions or higher pay, new positions or
new books, more or fewer adjuncts and the like. The Militant Accredita-
tion Model also removes the danger that union or anti-union predilections
might become a consideration in making personnel decisions. Of course
some of these issues would merely be shifted from the local to the national
AALS level, but that might be beneficial. After all, at the national level
we have to live together for but a few days a year and can always skip a
few years of suffering or enjoying each other's company.
The Militant Accreditation Model also enjoys a distinct fiscal advantage
over the collective bargaining model. For example, one suggestion heard
is that the AALS should get into the business of running for the office of
collective bargaining representative whenever such elections are held for
law faculty. But as collective bargaining agent, at least with respect to
nonpublic institutions, the Labor-Management Relations Act would pro-
hibit continued payment and receipt of annual AALS school membership
dues. Under the Labor-Management Relations Act, there are very few
lawful categories of fund transfers from employer to union. And an
3 See United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.) (3 judge
court) aff'd per curiam, 404 U.S. 802 (1970).
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employer, such as a law school, and a union, such as the AALS operating
in that capacity, would not fall within any of the exceptions.4 Hence,
AALS represented law teachers would have to individually provide their
school's present share of Association finances. By collectively securing
improved terms and conditions of employment through the Militant Ac-
creditation Model, however, we can continue lawfully to extract from our
employers the organization's budgetary support as well as our personal ex-
penses for attending meetings.
The debate concerning the best method or methods for resolving law
faculty pay and prerogatives is not new. I know of no consensus and do
not expect that we shall arrive at one this afternoon. Experience reveals
however, that such discussions rapidly lose their utility when the rhetoric
becomes overburdened by the declarative or exclamatory use of such terms
as "exploiting," "radical," "reactionary," "dedicated," or "public-minded-
ness." It will be a disappointment if our ensuing discussion, particularly
the discussion that follows from the audience, falls prey to excess use of
such volatile rhetoric-but it will be dismaying, on the other hand, if such
exclamations do not occasionally surface.
429 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
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JAMES B. MCCARTNEY*
Being in ignorance of the extent to which people in the audience are
labor lawyers or other people who have experienced practical trade union-
ism, could I just put one or two points first. Why a trade union at all?
It is so often forgotten that there is only one purpose of a trade union and
that is the defense and the advancement of the interests of its members.
And if you expect a trade union to do other things, well then you are ex-
pecting it to do things that it wasn't set up to do. (In our context a trade
union can and does spend a very large part of its time on the purely aca-
demic professional matters, probably far more time in our case in the As-
sociation of University Teachers in the United Kingdom than it does on
salary bargaining and other kinds of remuneration questions.)
Second, why collective bargaining? Why not go along with the present
system of using university machinery for discussion and eventually evolv-
ing decisions on this, that, and the other? We have had varied experiences
in our different universities of how the university machinery works. In
many cases we have found that it is a case of manipulation by the admin-
istration of the academic senate and the other decision-making bodies. In
other cases it has not been manipulation but genuine discussion, but so
often it has been manipulation.
I think we have all been experiencing a new factor. We have had it
for ten years in the United Kingdom. You, I think, have had it for about
three years, and, from what I have seen, it has just started in Canada. I
refer to governmental restriction on university financing. So far as we are
concerned in the United Kingdom, it produced a new factor of such di-
mension that it turned our old-time professors into trade unionists. Those
people used to shudder when ten years ago I got up and asked what the
union was doing and was slapped down by the then President. Today this
same man gets up and wants to know what the hell the union is doing not
only about salary but also about academic freedom and other such matters.
And why representation? Well, first of all there is a practical need for
recognition by the institution for purposes of discussion and reaching
agreement with it, but also the type of labor relations system you have re-
quires a particular kind of machinery to determine that kind of recognition.
Why separate bargaining at all for the law faculty? Well, I think that
you may well have to reach a mixed position, and all I say at this stage is
that there are many things which are common to university staffs as a
whole and it would seem to me these need to be met by some other kind
of united voice, not least of which is the direct effect of governmental
* Professor, University of Belfast, Ireland; Visiting Professor, 1971-72, Queens University,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada. Professor McCartney has served as a member of the negotiating
committee of the Association of University Teachers in the United Kingdom.
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stringency on the financing of higher education, and it would seem to me
these need to be met by some kind of united voice. There may be other
things which have to be separately bargained if the party which does the
general bargaining is not responsive to the needs and the aspirations of a
particular section.
Having said that, let me turn to what I have said in my written com-
ments.'
The first thing I have done is to point out the dangers of trying to take
something from one country and transplant it to any other country. So
often it doesn't even work in the system you have taken it from. And if
it does work, it may work for reasons other than those supposed. So, just
watch the danger, the tremendous danger, of picking something up from
the British system and trying to make it work here. Almost certainly it
won't. But in doing this kind of comparative study we can perhaps get a
range of models and, maybe more than anything, some idea of the things
that go wrong.
The background of the labor relations system in Britain is a very dif-
ferent one. Until now we have not had the positively-regulated system
that you have had here for so long and which Canada introduced ten years
ago. We have had a negatively-regulated system in which it was left to
the parties to reach, first of all, agreement (or not) on the question of the
right to form a trade union, the right to recognition and the right to col-
lective bargaining. The law interfered only in a negative way, but could
interfere pretty heavily in a number of situations. In particular, we have
utterly no concept of any need for a special labor relations system for the
public sector. It is something that, even after five months in Canada and
after having lectured here three years ago in Chicago, I can grasp intellec-
tually that you have got a great felt need for a separate public sector bar-
gaining situation, but--quite frankly-I don't understand that need. We
don't know why you make such a big thing of it. We don't have it, so we
don't have this factor which affects you in university collective bargaining.
One thing that we do have, though, affects many of you as well--cuts
in financing-and I suspect it is going to affect you more and more as the
total education budget spirals and therefore governments become con-
cerned about how to cut the overall sum. This has been our experience.
All of the something like forty universities in the United Kingdom get
almost their entire funds from the government through one public source
or another. Even Oxford and Cambridge, with their heavy tradition of
endowments, now rely more and more on what they get from the govern-
ment. This comes in two main ways. One is a direct grant through the
University Grants Committee, a governmental body with some indepen-
1 Professor McCarmey prepared a written commentary distributed at the beginning of the
session. Though the text of his spoken remarks departed somewhat from his written comments,
the full substance of the latter is reflected in these published remarks and in the footnotes.
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dence, set up to police both the estimating procedures and the expenditure
procedures of universities on a five-year basis. It acts largely as a buffer
between the government, in this case the Department of Education, and the
universities themselves. Though the universities being independent orga-
nizations set up by charter, have nominally a very high degree of inde-
pendence from government interference, whoever pays the piper can call
the tune in so many situations. We have been seeing, in the past three
years, more of the not so covert interference with the things that univer-
sities wanted to do, both in restricting us as to funds and in requiring
that the funds which were allocated be channeled into particular disci-
plines. The other main area of governmental funds going to universities,
a big one, is the allocation made by the Research Councils: the Social
Science Research Council, the Science Research Council, and the Medical
Research Council. Large sums are poured into the United Kingdom uni-
versities through these sources, but all are governmentally funded. With-
in the past two or three years, because of the outcry about the large amount
of public money which universities were spending, with apparently little
control as to what they did with it (and there was and still is a shocking
amount of waste going on inside universities), both the Public Accounts
Committee at Westminster and the Comptroller and Auditor General
were given power to investigate university spending of public money.
Another factor in the situation was the creation quite a number of years
ago of a completely unofficial but very important and very powerful Com-
mittee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, which did most of the collec-
tive negotiation on behalf of the universities with the University Grants
Committee and with the Department of Education. They also were for
many years a buffer against the AUT, the Association of University Teach-
ers, in getting proper bargaining machinery.2
I think the next factor, as I gather it is here, is that we had a vast di-
versity of the extent of faculty participation in university government and
university decision-making. Sometimes there was real decision-making,
more often it was a facade of decision-making. The decisions were made
by the administration and the various committees were manipulated, not the
least because most of our colleagues go into such committee meetings with-
out even having read their documents never name prepared themselves.
Another factor is that with us the title "professor" is given only to
heads of departments (with the exception of a few, rare, personal chairs).
This has produced the situation of "professors and others," a great polari-
zation between heads of departments and the rest of the faculty. In the
2 The AUT now represents over 20,000 of the 25,000 potential academic and related staffs
(senior library and senior administrative). It registered as a trade union eighteen months ago
and achieved a remarkably high affirmative poll in a ballot for affiliation to the Trade Union
Congress (the equivalent of the AFL/CIO). [Added from Professor McCartney's prepared
written comments.)
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typical university power structure, and indeed built into most of their char-
ters, participation in the decision-making bodies is automatically the right
of "professors" only and this has intensified the polarization between pro-
fessors and the rest of the faculty. Procedures for determining the em-
ployment conditions of all types of staff members range from built in pro-
visions in the charters themselves, through a paternalistic or a despotic ap-
proach by the administration to, in a relatively small number of instances,
genuine discussion and decision making in consultation and agreement with
the local branch of the Association of University Teachers. The general
picture is probably one of discussing with the AUT, reaching an agreement
with the AUT, but implementing it by putting that proposal to the appro-
priate university decision-making body, where it comes out as a decision of
that committee or of the academic senate or whatever. The university
consequently avoids openly negotiating with the Association of University
Teachers so far as the knowledge of the bulk of the staff of the university
is concerned. That is what we had until about three years ago when there
was a great outburst against the National Board of Prices and Incomes Re-
port No. 98, particularly proposals about merit increases.
As a result of that outburst we got enough pressure generated behind
a rather old-guard executive. (Our structure produces an executive which
is years behind the general feeling of the membership.) A demand was
put so forcefully then that we secured from the government an immediate
promise of national bargaining machinery. That bargaining machinery
took about a year to achieve in detail.
You may first of all ask why national bargaining machinery. Well
since we have got this position of the vast bulk of all money coming from
the government, the government being the paymaster but the individual
universities being our employers, we had buck-passing from one to the
other. The government said we cannot bargain directly with you because
that would be interfering with academic freedom. The universities said we
can't bargain with you because there is no body to speak for the univer-
sities as a whole, they are independent and self-governing, and the Com-
mittee of Vice-Chancellors, being an unofficial body, is not in a position to
speak for the universities either.
As a result of the promise of national bargaining machinery, pressure
was put on the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals to go back to
the university and bring back an agreement that they would set up a body
to represent the universities officially. This became known as the Univer-
sity Authoritites Panel and that became the negotiating body on behalf of
the universities collectively. The AUT meets that body, the UAP, at Stage
A of the two-stage national bargaining machinery. There is also an inde-
pendent chairman, appointed by the government. Because the attitude of
the University Grants Committee (UGC) has been a very positive and very
1972]
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useful one, by agreement between the University Authorities Panel and the
Association of University Teachers, that Committee is present at Stage A
as an observer, though it is the government's advisor and, against the Com-
mittee's desire, advises the government confidentially. There are provi-
sions for arbitration if there is no agreement at Stage A. The result com-
ing out of that, whether agreement or arbitration, goes to Stage B, where
the UAP more or less switches sides. At this stage the UAP aud the
AUT jointly face the government over the table and bargain on the agreed,
or arbitrated, proposals from Stage A. Our experience-there only have
been two rounds so far-has confirmed entirely the unsatisfactory nature
of this arrangement.
This has got to be seen in the context of the fact that we had nothing
for fifty years and of the deepening shifts of the prices and incomes' poli-
cies, almost entirely income policies, for some ten years. As part of the
Incomes Policy legislation which we have had for a number of these years,
a Prices and Incomes Board was set up to police all claims. The policies
of the National Board of Prices and Incomes, as far as the private sector
is concerned, have been virtually of no effect. At a time when there was a
nil norm or a 3% norm for increases, the average increase in all employ-
ment earnings was 7.5%. But in the public sector, where the government
is the paymaster, it almost always can enforce the Board's policy and only
in the rare situation where there is real power and militancy on the part
of the public sector employees' organization is there a real fight. In our
case, in the first round we came out of Stage A with an agreement of 13%,
which was endorsed by the independent chairman, and the government im-
mediately cut it to ten, simply on the basis of a prices and incomes policy,
no argument, no discussion.
In order to get on with a salary restructuring job, which we all thought
would give us a much better increase and a much better position for fur-
ther increases (this had been recommended by the Prices and Incomes
Board in its swan song, Report No. 148) a divided AUT executive agreed
to accept the 10%. A second round has now gone through Stages A and
B. We came out of A with an average of 16% increase, which the govern-
ment immediately cut down to 6.5% with no argument about merit, no dis-
cussion whatsoever, except that this was the Chancellor of the Exchequer's
guideline in the current period of incomes policy. So it is now going to
arbitration at the tail-end of the process, at the tail-end of Stage B. This
will be our first test of arbitration and we will see now whether arbitra-
tion in our sector is any different from the way arbitration has been in the
private sector in a period of incomes policy restriction. There the unions
have had to get away from the arbitration courts because they have been
following government policy irrespective of the merits.
This has been our general experience in the U.K. universities so far as
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bargaining is concerned. I come now to the next point, the question of
sectional differentials. In any employment situation and in any trade
union, if a particular group or section sees that its interests are not being
adequately met, you will have pressures for a change. Either pressures
which result in sectionalization of the union structure and bargaining on a
sectional basis, or else pressures culminating in breakaway organizations.
We have many of these pressures in the U.K. You have them here as well,
though the situation here is so much affected by the Labor Relations Board
representation procedure. I think you are now getting this kind of thing
in the universities, particularly the demand for separate representation for
law faculties, because of the market situation.
We have, and this was disclosed particularly by the Prices and Incomes
Board Report No. 148, a similarly favorable market situation for law fac-
ulties. Our experience has been of a single but long standing differential-
a plus salary situation for doctors brought about by the militancy of the
British Medical Association which was prepared to fight, particularly for the
middle and senior doctors in general practice and in the hospitals, especial-
ly after 1948 when the National Health Act put the National Exchequer
behind the hospitals. They have long had a plus salary over the rest of the
university staff. Since the introduction of the hospital service this has been
in the form of joint appointments, one with the university and one with
the hospital, and two separate salaries. They get the normal university sal-
ary from the university and they get another salary, usually of about the
same amount, from the hospital service. There are also some merit awards
for the top-the deans and the other top specialists in the medical field.
The AUT has for many years set its face against other differentials on.
the basis that this was divisive. Also, we need solidarity in order to im-
prove university salaries as a whole, because they have lagged over the
past twelve years in relation to the civil service, who by manipulating the
incomes policy were very careful to see that it did not affect them, and when
it did, they recovered retrospectively. This certainly has not applied to the
education sector, particularly to the higher education sector where the
teacher organizations were by no means well represented.' They were too
concerned about respectability, too concerned about academic freedom.
But, as I have already indicated, with ten years of cuts and interferences a
great change came about.
Finally, some vital United Kingdom differences. Our law schools are
far less oriented to practice than yours. So far as I can see almost all law
graduates here go into law practice of one kind or another. This is not
3 Maintenance of this policy has been assisted by market variations, not least the sudden
switch of research support from the physical sciences to the social sciences a couple of years ago.
Research done for Report No. 145 of the NBPI revealed that market pressures were heavily
against Universities in Law but, as yet, no substantial demand for plus salaries for law faclty
has arisen. [Added from Professor McCartney's prepared written comments.]
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so in the United Kingdom. Consequently the piofessional bodies, the
Law Society in relation to the solicitors and the Inns of Court and Bar
Council in relation to the Bar, have much less influence on the curricula
and other standards of law faculties, and, therefore, so far as that is con-
cerned, we lack strong outside pressure for law faculty standards. Also,
though we have the Society for Public Teachers of Law, which in some
ways corresponds to the Association of American Law Schools, only twice
in its existence has it done anything to advocate standards. Once was about
law libraries, many years ago, and again about seven years ago it put for-
ward salary proposals to one of the predecessors of the Prices and Incomes
Board. We do not, therefore, have the accreditation system which the As-
sociation of American Law Schools has and that pressure may be powerful.
Maybe I misunderstand the situation, maybe it isn't all that powerful, may-
be the pressure of the bar in America and Canada is not all that powerful
either, but it appears anyway that you have got outside bodies able to ex-
ert pressures which we do not have. I think that this can be one big fac-
tor in your situation.
As I see it then, if your financial stringencies continue, and this is a new
factor that we have all got to live with and got to meet, you are going to
be faced with continuing and increasing demands for greater union as dis-
tinct from association activity. Greater attention to the bread and butter
problems of remuneration as well as-and I must stress as well as-the
academic and professional questions. The Association of University
Teachers, let me say again, spends more of its time on questions of aca-
demic standards, professional standards, and academic freedom, than it does
on remuneration and other money matters. But I think you are going to
be met with this problem. However you meet it, you will have to decide
whether you increase, as has been suggested, the effect of the accreditation
system; whether you increase the pressure by the various bar associations,
coupled with general assistance to whatever body does the collective bar-
gaining; or, whether you utilize collective bargaining, and, if I may go
back, perhaps on two bases: an overall collective bargaining situation to
handle those matters which are common to all faculty and a sectionalized
collective bargaining system on behalf of the law faculty alone.
REMARKS:
W. WILLARD VIRTZ*
I'll take as my guide Mr. Crowley's approach, which is simply to state
a position and then to await any further developments in the question
period which follows. There is, though, a difference. He takes that posi-
tion from the confidence of knowing more about this subject than anyone
else in the room. I take it as a counsel of desperation, having thought less
about it than anybody else here.
I reach a contrary conclusion as far as this matter of a separate bargain-
ing unit is concerned.
This is partly because of what seems to me a mistaken, but currently ac-
cepted, shibboleth regarding collective bargaining. If collective bargaining
is to be conceived of as entirely and exclusively the interplay of the power
of one group against another, with no room for the arbitrament of reason,
it is not an attractive instrument for the effectuation of academic purposes
-- or any others.
But that evades the question of whether the law school faculties should
be included in or included out of the university unit. It seems to me that
at a time when the issue of university governance is one of the most im-
portant issues facing the society, the members of the law faculty have a
very important contribution to make in that matter. This has been evi-
denced in the leadership which law faculty members have taken during the
last two or three years, particularly in connection with the matters of stu-
dent expression along lines quite different from those which we think of
as traditional. I see the prospect of real loss in our excusing ourselves from
taking that same leadership as far as this bargaining process is concerned.
A final point involves the concept of what legal education should be
and will be in the future. The NLRB suggests that one reason for a sepa-
rate law school unit is that members of law faculty see so little of the rest
of the university faculty. I think we are moving rapidly away, however,
from the virtual intellectual educational isolationism of three years of legal
education after four years of something else. I think we're moving rapid-
ly toward the time when there will be an interchange of faculty and an in-
terdependence of subject matter, with the whole time trap pattern of edu-
cation and life being broken up. The law school will no longer be a sepa-
rate three years conducted on an entirely different set of principles with an
entirely different set of approaches directed toward ostensibly different sets
of purposes.
I assume that we can dismiss as demeaning the possibility that the prin-
cipal consideration which may have entered into this discussion is the pro-
*Washington, D.C.; Secretary of Labor, 1962-1969; Professor of Law, Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1939-43, 1946-60.
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tection of a higher salary level in the law schools than what is characteristic
of the rest of the university. We would obviously all subscribe to the prop-
osition that the teacher who does a child the most good should receive
the highest salary-recognizing that this means that the first grade teacher
should get the $25,000 salary, and the law school professor the $7,000 or
$8,000.
In briefest summary, I would argue from the importance of participa-
tion of the law faculties in university governance as a whole, and from
the belief that legal education should be tied more and more closely to the
rest of education, to the conclusion that the separate bargaining unit deci-
sion is a mistake.
REMARKS:
THOMAS P. LEwiS*
In light of what I am going to say, I should begin by pointing out that
I teach labor law and as an occasional arbitrator I get involved in the ad-
ministration of collective bargaining agreements. I am very sympathetic
with the goals and purposes of collective bargaining, but I do agree with
the report of the special committee chaired by Bob Gorman that law
faculties ought to seek severance when their university faculties attempt to
organize to select a collective bargaining representative. And though I
agree with the reasons stated in that report for this conclusion, I would
add even more basic reasons that perhaps are implied in the report but are
not expressly brought out.
Professor Crowley asked, What can a law faculty do when its univer-
sity faculty is trending toward collective bargaining? I would suggest that
one thing the law faculty can do and should do at a very early stage is to
take a leadership role in trying to persuade the university faculty that col-
lective bargaining is not a safe, sensible goal in the university environment.
Let me point out in fairly conclusionary terms why I feel this way. There
is not time here today to develop any of these thoughts very fully.
I assume that use of the phrase "collective bargaining" implies models
of employee participation in private and public employment as developed
by labor organizations. In the industrial world the principal function of
collective bargaining is to supply one strong voice for the many weak voices
of individual workers. The major goal of collective bargaining is to
achieve for the worker some share in the government of his life as an em-
ployee. Unless workers can speak with a collective voice, an employer is
apt to have virtually total say with respect to the employment situation.
Without collectivization government in an industrial setting might resem-
ble a virtual dictatorship. A more specific goal of collective bargaining
has been to achieve for the worker a measure of job security. Typical sub-
stantive provisions of collective bargaining agreements protect workers
from discharge except for "just cause" and base job rights and benefits on
seniority. Over 95 percent of existing collective bargaining contracts
contain agreements by the parties to permit the submission of unresolved
disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the contracts to
impartial arbitrators. When a worker claims that he was fired without ap-
propriate or adequate grounds or that he was improperly passed over for
promotion, etc., his complaint may be submitted to an outside arbitrator
who will interpret the collective bargaining agreement and reach a final
and binding decision on the merits. Successful collective bargaining by
* Professor of Law, Boston University. Professor Lewis was a member of the University of
Minnesota faculty when these remarks were delivered.
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workers generally requires the threatened or actual use of economic muscle
to back up the demands of the collective workers. Typically, strikes and
picketing provide this muscle. The workers have the power and generally
the right to withhold their services in order to bring pressure to bear on
their employer during the negotiation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
Now let us consider briefly these techniques and goals of organized
workers in relation to the university environment. Workers organize
themselves into labor organizations in order to substitute one strong voice
for their many weak voices. But as I understand and know the university,
the faculty has a collective voice. Through a faculty senate or other orga-
nization, the faculty has available to it the necessary means to speak col-
lectively. A senate may or may not be effective in a particular university,
but if it is typical in organization it will most probably be a large and broad-
ly representative body. A collective bargaining representative, on the other
hand, though always representative in theory may or may not be repre-
sentative in fact. It is generally thought that to succeed collective bargain-
ing must be conducted by an individual or very small committee. It is gen-
erally believed that successful collective bargaining requires acceptance of
the principle of exclusive representation, i.e., the principle that the collec-
tive bargaining representative, elected by a majority of the employees in a
designated unit of employees, speaks authoritatively for each and every em-
ployee in the unit. In the university setting a designated unit of employ-
ees might be every member of the university faculty. When I try to imagine
a collective bargaining representative speaking authoritatively for an en-
tire university faculty, or even a college or department faculty, I see a re-
quirement for more collectivization-more solidarity, if you will-among
faculty members than we can reasonably expect to find in most university en-
vironments. I personally feel that efforts to generate the required soli-
darity will create an undesirable climate and that the requisite solidarity, if
achieved, will not work ultimately to the advantage of the university fac-
ulty. I must leave this simply as a felt notion rather than one that I can
elaborate upon in the limited time available.
I said earlier that a major goal of collective bargaining is to give em-
ployees a voice in the government of the employment situation. The uni-
versity I know is one in which the faculty member now has a very power-
ful voice in his own government, especially at the college or department
level. Where in the industrial world will you find employees gathering
to hear a committee report filed by a committee of their own members
and making recommendation concerning standards for promotion and
job security and then, through their votes, designing effectively what
the standards for promotion or tenure of employment should be? Where
in the industrial world will you find employees making the initial applica-
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tion of such standards to new employees-employees who were hired in
the first place because they received a favorable vote from the existing
employee group? In the industrial world initial hiring is generally left
totally to the employer and standards for discharge and promotion are typi-
cally negotiated out and placed in the collective bargaining agreement.
Typically these standards place the initiative in the employer and provide
the employer with substantial discretion. An aggrieved employee might
appeal his employer's exercise of discretion by invoking grievance proce-
dures which call for in-plant discussion of his grievance between the em-
ployer and his labor organization. If his labor organization is willing to
pursue his complaint it may finally be submitted to an impartial arbitrator
who will decide whether the employer improperly applied any standards
appearing in the contract. Surely, if instead of speaking of an employee
with a grievance we speak of a former employee whose grievance is that
he was improperly discharged, we can see that faculty members in general
now have much greater job security than most workers who enjoy collec-
tive bargaining. The job security of most workers is ultimately dependent
upon the judgment of an impartial outsider, an arbitrator. Among public
employees who have organized for collective bargaining the trend appar-
ently is away from civil service models and towards impartial arbitration.
Faculty members should compare their existing tenure systems, whatever
they may be, with a system in which impartial third parties possibly com-
ing from outside the university environment make ultimate decisions con-
cering charges leveled against faculty members.
I have said that effective collective bargaining requires the means by
which pressures can be brought to bear upon the employer and that these
pressures typically result from the strike. In the public sphere where the
strike is outlawed the trend has been to provide a substitute for the strike
in the form of a process by which the workers can take their unresolved
negotiation disputes with the employer to an impartial third party, again an
arbitrator or a fact-finder, who will consider the positions of the employer
and the employees and then either determine the matter or make recom-
mendations for its determination. My instincts tell me that faculties are
not going to be very powerful in the use of the strike, even in those seg-
ments in which the strike is permissible because the employer is a private
rather than a public employer. In the public sphere the strike will continue
to be outlawed, and even if it is occasionally used I think the very fact of
its outlawry will stand in the way of a powerful solid strike action, and I
think faculties who attempt to use that weapon may simply demonstrate
weaknesses that were not immediately apparent to the legislature and to the
administration. If use of the strike is avoided, a judgment must of course
be made as to whether third-party resolution of the terms of employment is
preferable to those various methods by which the terms of faculty employ-
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ment are currently hammered out. My personal judgment is that university
government should not be turned over to disinterested third parties.
I feel very strongly that university faculties are currently a giant step
beyond collective bargaining. Faculties share in their own government at
a stage well beyond the stage that has been achieved by employees who en-
gage in collective bargaining. Moreover, it seems to me that the basic
functions and goals of collective bargaining presuppose a much sharper
line between management (supervision) and worker than exists in the uni-
versity, where there is a proliferation of administration but precious little
management. To insist on collective bargaining for a university faculty
is, I believe, to force the backward creation of this sharper line between
administration and faculty and indirectly to introduce restraints on the fac-
ulty that do not now exist. (Take a look at collective bargaining agree-
ments currently in force in the academic world).
Finally, I believe collective organization and bargaining along the lines
of existing movements may weaken the impact of faculties as now orga-
nized on such issues as academic freedom. The stance of the AAUP on
this issue as I understand it is principled; it is not currently seen as essen-
tially nothing more than articulated self-interest, as many of the gains
achieved through collective bargaining by workers are seen.
I have tried to suggest some pragmatic reasons why collective bargain-
ing does not appear to me to be a sensible goal in the university environ-
ment. Willard Wirtz, I think, touched upon additional reasons, grounded
in principle, as to why collective bargaining might be inadequate and in-
appropriate. I have spoken very generally and against a background of
the university environment with which I am familiar. I recognize that
conditions vary markedly among universities and law schools. My thoughts
may have little or no relevance for a school in which conditions of employ-
ment, as in some junior colleges where collective bargaining has caught on
and where many of the collective bargaining agreements I just referenced
originated, more closely approximate those in the private sector of employ-
ment organized by labor unions. It may be that my remarks do not have
relevance to some situations known to you. I hope in the discussion which
follows that if you disagree with me, you will isolate for us the kinds of
problems that you see in your university environment which you think
could be solved through collective bargaining.
